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The process of regulation and supervision of the financial system represents a 
pillar for the financial stability. A recent trend in the institutional framework for financial 
supervision is the creation of a Single Supervision Authority for the supervision of the 
banking  sector,  the  insurances  and  the  capital  markets.  In  the  financial  supervision 
literature, a lot of arguments highlight the fact that such institutions are necessary, but 
there are also other valid arguments which show that the banking supervision must be 
made  by  central  banks.  Taking  into  account  these  arguments  we  show  that  the 
institutional regulation and supervision framework reflects the structure of the Romanian 
financial  system  and  the  specialized  supervision  architecture  in  place  in  Romania  is 
compatible with the European supervision framework. The National Bank of Romania has 
a  solid  experience  in  banking  sector  supervision  and  the  activity  of  financial 
conglomerates is not yet a menace for the Romanian financial system stability. That is 
why the implementation of a unified supervision framework does not represent an optimal 
solution at the moment.  
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The process of regulation and supervision of the financial system represents a 
pillar for the financial stability. Many specialists consider that the establishment of a 
Single Supervision Authority (SSA) is necessary in order to preserve the financial system 
stability.  Such  authorities  are  independent  from  central  banks  and  their  role  is  the 
regulation and supervision of all financial sectors, including the banks. The aim of the 
SSA implementation is the demarcation between the two goals of central banks, price 
stability  and  financial  stability,  and  the  elimination  of  the  trade-off  between  these 
objectives.  It  is  considered  that  a  SSA  is  also  specialized  in  financial  conglomerates 
supervision, a new challenge for the financial stability. 
The  construction  of  a  unique  supervision  authority  does  not  represent  an 
optimal solution in all the cases. These authorities do not have the necessary means of 
intervention  to  guarantee  the  financial  stability  and  they  can  be  subject  to  political 
pressure  because  they  act  as  governmental  agencies  or  agencies  subordinated  to  the 
Parliament. It seems that the central banks are better placed to regulate and survey the 
banking sector, enjoying the required independence and credibility. 
During the last period, intense debates were conducted regarding the possibility 
to reorganise the regulation and supervision framework, both at European and national 
level. A priori we can not say that a certain supervision framework is performing better, Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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even if there is an obvious trend among European countries to unify the regulation and 
the supervision of different financial sectors. The decision for a SSA implementation 
must take into consideration the characteristics of each national financial system.  
In this study we intend to show that the Romanian supervision architecture in 
place is compatible with the financial system structure and that the National Bank of 
Romania (NBR) can not successfully accomplish its financial stability objective without 
performing the regulation and supervision of the banking sector. Moreover, the actual 
supervision  framework  enables  an  efficient  cooperation  with  the  corresponding 
authorities in place at European level. 
The structure of the study is the following: in the first section we analyse the 
characteristics required for a regulation and supervision authority to be efficient. In the 
next sections we present the arguments supporting the preservation of a fundamental role 
for central banks in banking supervision and we continue with the arguments in favour of 
a SSA in the third section. In the fourth section we analyse the European regulation and 
supervision framework. In the last section of this article we will present the status of 
unified supervision in several European countries and we will demonstrate that financial 
supervision  architecture  in  Romania  is  compatible  with  the  structure  of  the  financial 
system and with the European arrangements. The implementation of a Mixed Supervision 
Committee  by  the  members  of  the  NBR  and  the  members  of  the  others  supervision 
authorities,  under  the  NBR  coordination,  represents  at  present  a  better  solution  than 
setting up a SSA in the Romanian case. Finally we conclude.  
 
1. Requirements for the regulation and supervision authorities 
 
Even if we do not implicitly embrace from the very beginning the assumption 
that the best solution is to keep the supervision of the banking sector within the central 
bank, we must say that this function should be complementary to other financial stability 
related functions, named “the safety nets” (Cerna et al., 2008: p.68): deposit insurance, 
lender of last resort and payment systems administration. 
The supervision authorities must analyse objectively the financial conditions of 
each financial institution and of the financial system as a whole. Their impartiality can 
not  be  achieved  without  a  high  level  of  political  and  institutional  independence.  A 
supervision authority must also be credible because its regulations and decisions must be 
respected. The credibility and transparency of its actions ensure the independence, and, 
on the other hand, an independent supervision authority becomes  more credible. The 
supervision authorities must be accountable for their actions and should not be exposed to 
moral  hazard.  The  accountability  must  not  interfere  with  their  independence.  The 
transparency,  the  accountability,  the  independence  and  the  credibility  characterise 
successful central banks in their effort to reduce inflation and, at the same time, represent 
the attributes of an efficient supervision authority. 
Most of the literature focuses on analysing the transparency, the credibility and 
the independence of central banks in relation with the prices stability goal. We consider 
that these elements must also characterise the regulation and supervision authorities. An 
independent supervision authority can ensure the financial stability by offering adequate 
guarantees to the financial sector, especially under extreme conditions.  
1.1. The transparency 
In  the  economic  literature,  several  forms  of  transparency  necessary  for  a 
supervision  authority  are  mentioned:  political  transparency  (established  objectives), 
economic transparency (data and models), procedural transparency (decisions and votes), 
operational transparency and transparency related to the results of applied policies. Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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The transparency is a condition necessary for the central banks’ independence 
and also for the supervision authority’s independence (Ribeiro, 2002: p.5). The authority 
engaged in financial regulation and supervision must continuously inform the government 
and the public, at least in the same manner the central banks provide information about 
the monetary policy programme. 
Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between monetary policy 
transparency and financial supervision transparency. In the first case, a total transparency 
is not recommended (Eichengreen and Dincer, 2006: p.26)
1. The central banks are not 
always transparent in their monetary policy decisions. Cerna (2002: p.26) speaks about 
central banks’ secrecy, concept theorized for the first time by Goodfriend. By adopting 
this practice, the central bank reduces the transparency and obtains a decrease in the 
interest  rate  variability,  making  the  economic  agents  less  sensitive  to  changes  in  the 
monetary policy. Unlike monetary policy transparency, the transparency of supervision 
authorities’ activity must be substantial. 
The  debates  about  transparency  are  meant  to  increase  the  efficiency  of 
supervision authorities in achieving their objectives. The increase in transparency level is 
partially  associated  with  the  efforts  undertaken  to  enhance  the  accountability.  The 
transparency  of  established  strategies  and  decisions  can  make  the  economic  agents 
understand the present situation of the monetary policy and of the supervision framework. 
The  transparency  represents  a  pre-condition  for  the  accountability  (Schich  and  Seitz, 
1999: p.9). 
1.2. The accountability 
Another requirement for a supervision authority to accomplish its objectives is 
the accountability of its actions. The accountability means the obligation to explain and 
justify the actions and decisions, in terms of certain criteria, and the obligation to assume 
the  responsibility  for  making  decisions.  The  supervision  authority  accountability 
contributes  to  the  elimination  of  potential  conflicts  between  this  institution  and  the 
government.  
Quintyn  and  Taylor  (2004:  pp.15-16)  consider  that  “the  accountability  of 
independent  regulators  and  supervisors  is  the  key  for  their  effective  independence”. 
These specialists enumerate several criteria to be taken into consideration in order to 
achieve a real accountability: 
•  a clear legal basis; 
•  a clear and public statement of the objectives, as for example, preserving 
the stability of the financial system and the soundness of individual banks; 
•  the relationships with the executive, legislative and judicial bodies must 
be clearly defined; 
•  the  appointment,  replacement  and  dismissal  of  senior  officials  must 
respect a transparent procedure. 
1.3. The independence  
The independence of the supervision agencies represents a feature which is 
intensely  analysed  in  the  economic  literature.  The  successful  results  obtained  by  the 
central banks in their battle against inflation stimulated the interest for the supervision 
authority’s independence.   
The  independence  is  essential  to  counteract  the  natural  predilection  of 
politicians to expansionist economic policies. The politicians make promises in the short-
                                                 
1 Eichengreen said, when he was asked about the optimal level of central banks transparency 
concerning the monetary policy in a Centre Cournot Conference in Paris, 2006: „somewhere fewer 
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run for obtaining electoral benefits and at the same time they exacerbate the long term 
financial situation.  Thereby, the politicians can make pressure on the control authority to 
avoid the declaration of a bankruptcy. The independence of the supervision authorities 
represents for the financial stability what the independence of central bank means for the 
monetary stability, and the independence of these institutions allows them to strengthen 
each  other.  Both  organisms  provide  a  safety  net  –  the  financial  stability.  The 
independence of the supervision authority does not represent a target by itself, but it has 
an important contribution to achieving the statutory objectives. 
In  the  economic  literature  several  types  of  independence  are  approached. 
Schich and Seitz (1999: p.6) identify the institutional independence, the staff and the 
functional  independence.  Lybek  (2004:  pp.3-4)  prefers  the  term  “autonomy”  to  the 
frequently used term “independence” of central banks. He makes a distinction between 
several types of autonomy: goal autonomy (the central bank authority may determine its 
primary  objective  among  several  objectives  included  in  the  central  bank  law);  target 
autonomy  (there  is  one  clearly  defined  primary  objective  stipulated  in  the  law); 
instrument autonomy (implies the fact that the government decides the monetary policy 
target, in agreement with the central bank) and limited or no autonomy (means that the 
central bank is almost a government agency). 
A supervision agency decisions must not be influenced by the intervention of 
the ministers or of the Parliament. The agency must also have the necessary power and 
authority to act in its relation with the supervised firms (Abraham and Taylor, 2000: p.6). 
These prerogatives refer at least to: the possibility to ask for pertinent information from 
the regulated institutions, the capacity to assess the competences of superior management 
and shareholders, the possibility to apply penalties in case of infringement of the rules or 
even the possibility to intervene in the activity of the regulated institutions, if the case 
may be. 
An important weight is given to the financial independence of the supervision 
authority. The fulfilment of the financial stability goal can lead to a financial loss if this 
authority acts as a lender of last resort (LOLR). If the authority does not dispose of the 
necessary financial resources, it can become the target of political pressure. 
Quintyn and Taylor (2004: pp.8-9) identify four levels of independence of the 
regulation and supervision authority: 
1)  The  financial  sector  regulation  independence  means  that  the  agencies 
accountable must have sufficient autonomy to design the prudential and regulation rules, 
characteristics for the financial intermediation activity. 
2)  The control independence is crucial in the financial system and it is very 
difficult to ensure it. The control authorities work in close relation with the financial 
firms both for the inspection and control of the last ones, and for setting the penalty.  
3) The institutional independence refers to the supervision authority statute, 
outside the executive and legislative power and entails three critic elements. In the first 
place,  the  staff  should  benefit  from  the  work  place  stability  –  the  employment  and 
especially the revocation must be done based on clear rules, with the implication of two 
different  organisms.  In  the  second  place,  the  structure  of  the  control  authority 
management must include several specialist teams. In the third place, the decision must 
be  taken  in  a  transparent  way,  but  keeping  in  the  same  time  the  commercial 
confidentiality.  
4) The budgetary independence depends on the role of legislative and executive 
power  in  the  construction  of  the  authority’s  budget.  The  political  pressures  through 
budget must be avoided. Some control authorities finance their activity with the fees paid Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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by the controlled institutions. This practice limits the political immixture but increases the 
financial dependence towards controlled institutions. 
1.4. The credibility 
The credibility has the same importance for the supervision agency and for the 
monetary  authority.  A  credible  supervision  authority  has  a  better  resistance  towards 
political pressures and its regulations are better implemented by the private sector. In case 
a financial crisis occurs, the LOLR function can be accomplish only by a credible central 
bank, if the intended result is to limit the moral hazard. 
Waller and De Haan (2004: pp.10-11) present the result of an opinion survey 
made  among  several  private  sector  economists,  in  relation  with  the  central  banks 
credibility and transparency. They reach the conclusion that a credible central bank: may 
reduce the inflation at a lower social cost and can easier maintain it at the desired level; 
can act as a LOLR without being threatened in case of unaccomplished goals; can find 
public  support  to  ensure  its  independence.  In  the  same  way,  the  credibility  of  a 
supervision  authority  inhibits  the  decisions  vulnerability.  The  financial  institutions 
respect a trusty authority and wish to collaborate with it. The results obtained by the 
authors are influenced by the reputation of the analysed central banks.  
In conclusion, the regulation and supervision authority’s objectives must be 
clear and this authority must establish its own strategies and intervention instruments. 
The  goals  need  to  be  extremely  clear  in  order  to  avoid  the  trade-off  between  its 
objectives. An independent authority may enjoy of the necessary credibility.  
The transparency, the accountability, the independence and the credibility are 
necessary  but  they  do  not  represent  the  only  attributes  which  must  characterise  a 
supervision  authority.  Other  features  must  be  taken  into  consideration,  such  as:  the 
capacity to rapidly adapt to a changing environment, the agency efficiency and capability 
to avoid the regulation arbitration (in case the authority surveys more than one financial 
sector). In this case, the debate focuses on the arguments in favour of the integration of 
the regulation and supervision function within the central banks and on the arguments 
which concur to the implementation of a SSA.    
 
2. Arguments for the integration of the supervision function within central 
banks 
 
Central Banks objectives related to price stability and to financial stability are 
correlated  in  our  opinion,  although  a  compromise  between  these  two  objectives  may 
appear on short term.  
According to some authors, the periods of banking fragility are not generally 
periods  in  which  the  inflationist  pressures  are  important,  fact  that  diminishes  the 
importance of the argument stating that there is a synergy between the two objectives of 
central  banks  (Mishkin,  2001:  p.63).  There  are  also  authors  sustaining  the  need  to 
maintain the banking system supervision function within the central bank, an opinion 
which we also agree. Bieri (2004: p.3), quoting Tinbergen, asserts that if the central bank 
has only one instrument available, namely the monetary policy, it can achieve only one 
purpose – the objective related to price stability. Therefore, if the objective related to 
financial stability stays with the central bank’s responsibilities, the latter has to supervise 
the banking system. Any banking sector supervision regime has to make a connection 
between the supervision activity and the central bank, due to the liaisons between price 
stability and financial stability (Masciandaro, 2004: p.5). 
The banking regulation was practically implemented by the central bank to 
ensure the financial sector stability (Quintyn and Taylor, 2004: p.2). For the non-banking Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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financial  sector  (capital  market, insurances,  pensions  funds), the  regulation is usually 
ensured  either  by  a  ministry  or  by  a  specialized  organism  within  the  central 
administration. As we can observe, the achievement of both price and financial stability 
stands for a traditional duty of central banks and of other supervision agencies, but the 
fulfilment of these twin objectives is not possible without a close cooperation between 
these regulation and supervision bodies. Consequently, if one institution exercises both 
functions,  the  cooperation  problem  no  longer  exists.  If  the  task  related  to  financial 
stability maintenance was delegated to the central bank, the objectives of the stability 
function  must  be  clearly  stated  and  defined,  stipulated  in  laws  or  other  regulations 
(Oosterloo and De Haan, 2004: pp.260-261).   
A  combined  monetary  policy  and  banking  control  regime  has  specific 
advantages in terms of systemic stability: the information gathered by central banks from 
their supervision missions related to payment systems and monetary markets favours the 
detection of banks’ treasury difficulties, while the availability of prudential information 
enables a quicker intervention and a better management of the moral hazard related to 
liquidity injections, in the framework of LOLR actions.  
In our opinion there is an obvious synergy between the supervision function 
and the monetary policy function, because the information collected during the banks 
supervision  process  helps and  leads  to  the increase of  macroeconomic  forecasts. The 
accuracy of the forecasts related to macroeconomic variables is essential for the monetary 
policy, as it is a prospective policy. Sinclair (2000: p.388) underlines the synergy between 
the central bank objectives, namely prices stability and financial stability. The author 
states that the transition to a more reliable financial control regime will involve a lower 
level of the equilibrium prices, no matter the trajectory of the monetary aggregates. 
The ECB (2001: pp.4-6) study shows that in terms of prudential surveillance, 
the  central  bank  analyzes,  apart  from  the  soundness  of  individual  institutions,  the 
implications  on  systemic  risk,  while  a  SSA  mainly  carries  out  actions  to  protect  the 
depositors and the investors. Comparisons are performed, in the same study, between the 
arguments in favour or against the integration of the banking supervision function within 
the central bank. The arguments in favour of this integration are: 
a) The synergy of the information between the supervision function and the 
central  bank’s  fundamental  missions.  This  argument  underlines  the  importance  the 
confidential information gathered during the prudential control can have for the payment 
systems  and  for  the  good  conduct  of  the  monetary  policy.  Equally,  the  prudential 
information related to institutions susceptible to foster the systemic risk is crucial for 
macroprudential surveillance. Moreover, if a crisis appears in the banking system and the 
central bank has to intervene, it can react based on prudential information being familiar 
with  the  particular  status  of  a  bank  that  needs  liquidities.  Getting  this  information 
indirectly, through a SSA, may lead to misinterpretations.  
b)  The  particular  emphasis  on  systemic  risk.  There  is  a  close  connection 
between the prudential control on each intermediary and the assessment of the systemic 
risk.  Even  in  case  a  SSA  exists,  the  central  bank  has  a  significant  role  in  terms  of 
systemic financial stability. The central bank can better assess not only the probability of 
potential incidents related to macroeconomic shocks, or the turbulences on the markets, 
but  also  other  factors  that  affect  financial  stability,  as  for  example,  groups  of 
intermediaries.  
c)  The  independence  and  technical  expertise.  This  argument  underlines  the 
quality of the contribution the central banks can bring to financial system stability. The 
independence  of  the  supervision  authority  in  relation  with  political  interference  is 
important for ensuring the efficiency of the surveillance activity.  Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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The arguments in favour of keeping the banking sector supervision function 
within the central bank are often stated as arguments against the set up of a SSA. Taylor 
and  Abraham  (2000:  pp.16-18)  enumerate  some  arguments  in  this  respect  and  speak 
about a so-called “Pandora’s box”
2. The author’s explanations are rather related to the 
risks involved by the set up of a SSA and to the fact that the reasons underlying such 
decisions are not well-founded. 
a) The objectives may be unclear. One of the strongest arguments advanced 
against the unification of supervision functions within a SSA is the difficulty to find the 
equilibrium between the different objectives of the regulation. Due to their diversity – 
from the protection against systemic risk to investors’ protection – it is possible that a 
unique regulation authority can not clearly focus on rational objectives and can not make 
the difference when it comes for the regulation of different types of institutions. 
b) Diseconomies of scale. Economies of scale represent an important argument 
in favour of a Single Supervision Agency, but we have to admit that diseconomies can 
also occur. A source of inefficiency can appear due to the fact that a single agency is in a 
monopole  position,  and  the  new  structure  can  be  more  rigid  and  more  bureaucratic. 
Another  source  for  scale  diseconomies  is  the  “Christmas  tree  effect”.  This  happens 
because politicians can be tempted to assign them tasks connected to the main functions. 
For example, in Scandinavian countries, the agencies have been assigned tasks related to 
the supervision of the brokers on real estate markets.     
c) Limited synergies. Some critics of the unification indicate a reduced gain 
caused by the unification, namely the economies of scope are probably less significant 
than the economies of scale. For example, the banks’ risk source lies with the assets side 
of the balance sheet, while most of the insurance companies’ risks are related to the 
balance sheet liabilities side. In addition, the supervision procedures for two financial 
sectors are different.  
d) Moral hazard. Maybe the most alarming argument against the unification is 
the moral hazard. It is based on the assumption that the public will suppose that all the 
creditors of the supervised institutions will receive equal protection.   
An  element  which  is  not  put  forward  in  the  cost-benefit  analyses  in  the 
economic  literature  is  the  fact  that  most  of  central  banks  are  charged  with  financial 
stability. Financial stability has both a macroeconomic and a microeconomic dimension, 
closely correlated. In case the central bank will no longer ensure the microeconomic 
stability (stability achieved by means of the regulation and supervision functions) it is 
very difficult to manage the systemic stability. 
Moreover, if the central bank will have price stability as its unique objective, 
this does not mean that its fulfilment will be easy to attain. Central bank’s actions would 
                                                 
2  Within  “Pandora’s  Box”,  four  types  of  risks  involved  by  the  eventual  set  up  of  a  SSA  are 
presented.  One  of  the  risks  comes  from  the  political  sector,  some  politicians  considering  this 
unification process as an opportunity to increase their influence. The second risk is a legislative 
one.  The  establishment  of  a  single  supervision  agency  will  imply  the  need  to  change  the 
legislation,  but  this  situation  can  make  possible  the  capture  of  the  process  by  certain  interest 
groups. Another disadvantage of the unification is the eventuality not to solve the discrepancies in 
the  regulation.  A  third  risk  caused  by  the  change  is  the  possible  reduction  of  the  regulation 
capacity due to the loss of key personnel. Part of the employees will consider the unification 
process difficult and they prefer to avoid it. In this way, some of them, even if they are good 
experts, can feel threaten and look for other jobs or choose to retire. A fourth risk is the change of 
the  management,  which  could  slow  down  the  regulation  process.  The  unification  of  the 
surveillance supposes a need of human resources – management staff – exactly in environments 
were there is a lack of such personnel. 
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depend  far too  much  on the  fiscal  policy  as  well  as  on  the  existence of  an efficient 
supervision framework. That is why the cooperation with the political authorities and the 
central bank’s involvement in the systemic financial stability will represent the key for 
achieving the purposes of this institution.  
However, the integration of the banking sector supervision within the central 
bank does not represent always an optimal solution. There are also arguments according 
to which it is recommended that the supervision of the entire financial system should be 
performed by a SSA. Thus, in systems characterized by the existence of complex capital 
markets, where it is difficult to delimit the sectoral activities, the informational benefits 
gained  by  a  central  bank  can  be  reduced.  In  addition,  the  presence  of  financial 
conglomerates  together  with  the  lack  of  central  bank’s  experience  in  the  supervision 
activity recommends the set up of a SSA.  
 
3. Arguments for setting up a Single Supervision Agency 
 
Apparently,  the  best  way  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the regulation  and 
banking control authority is to integrate this function within an independent central bank. 
As the independence of the central bank is widely accepted nowadays, the single control 
authority could enjoy, in its turn, of this independence. Therefore, an alternative to the 
integration  within  the  central  banks  of  the  function  related  to  the  regulation  and 
supervision  of  the  banking  sector  is  to  set  up  a  distinct  single  supervision  authority, 
responsible for the supervision of banking, securities and insurance sectors. There is an 
increasing trend in respect of the creation of unique supervision bodies, fact that obliges 
the decision making and legislative bodies to review the institutional provisions, in order 
to guarantee their independence.   
Masciandaro  (2004:  pp.2-3)  performs  a  cost-benefit  analysis  related  to  the 
constitution of a SSA and he reaches the conclusion that there is no superior supervision 
framework, even if a trend to concentrate the financial supervision regimes has been 
lately  observed:  Norway  (1986),  Island,  Austria,  Denmark  (1988),  Sweden  (1991), 
England and Korea (1997), Latvia (1998), Estonia (1999), Hungary (2000), Japan (2001), 
Malta  (2002),  Germany  (2002)  and  Belgium  (2004).  This  cost-benefit  analysis  is 
described in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: The traditional cost-benefit analysis applied to the constitution of a SSA   
  Expected benefits  Expected costs 
Authority – Regulated 
firms relationships 
Supervision costs and 
supervision arbitrage – decrease    
Capture risks and innovation 
disincentives – increase   
Authority – political system 
relationships 
Independence gains – increase    Capture risks – increase   
Economies of scale – increase    Diseconomies of scale – 
increase 
Authority – internal 
organization  
Goal conflicts and 
internalization benefits – 
increase   
Goal conflicts and 
internalization benefits – 
increase   
Financial services 
customers  
Confidence benefits – increase   Overconfidence costs – 
increase    
Source: Masciandaro (2004: p.5)  
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Goodhart  (2004:  pp.5-6),  promoting  the  supervision  structure  in  England, 
shows that each institution (Central Bank, FSA
3 and Treasury) has clear established tasks 
in relation with the financial stability. The FSA is a supervision authority responsible for 
the  supervision  of  individual  financial  institutions,  while  the  central  bank  has  the 
responsibility to ensure a good functioning of the payments system and, by extension, the 
responsibility for the supervision of the structure and soundness of the settlement and 
clearing system of the main financial markets: bonds market, foreign exchange market 
and, maybe to a smaller extent, the stock market. The author considers this function 
separation process a more complicated but maybe more “democratic” process.  
The arguments in favour of the set up of a SSA are as numerous as those 
militating for the integration of the supervision function within the central banks. These 
arguments comprise a potential conflict between monetary policy objectives and financial 
stability objectives and the arguments in favour of the maintenance of a formal role for 
the  central  bank  (the  case  of  Bundesbank  for  example)  refer  to  the  synergy  and 
circulation of information, in particular the maintenance of the appropriate functioning of 
the payment system.  
Gulde and Wolf (2004: p.60) sustain only a formal involvement of the central 
bank in the supervision activity. The authors consider that a number of factors argue for a 
gradualist  approach  initially  focusing  only  on  the  small  subset  of  banks  that  can  be 
described as multinational: 
•  the case for a multi-lateral supervisor depends on the importance of cross-
border activity, spillovers and externalities; 
•  the potential problems identified in theory refer however to the current 
system of national supervision, determined by the commercial bank headquarter location 
and to the extensive need of coordination in respect of additional information flow; 
•  in  the  near  future  European  banking  and  insurance  concerns  will 
experience  substantial  change  in  the  wake  of  Basel  II,  Solvency  II,  and  revisions  of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
ECB  (2001:  pp.6-8)  also  elaborated  a  list  of  arguments  in  favour  of  the 
segregation  of  the  price  stability  function  from  the  supervision  function  and  they 
identified three main elements in this respect: 
a)  The  conflict  of  interests  between  supervision  and  monetary  policy.  A 
prudential concern related to the fragility of the banking system can determine the central 
bank to adopt a more lax monetary policy and not to pay attention to the achievement of 
the inflation objective, in particular in case a crisis occurs. The fundamental argument in 
this respect is that through the maintenance of price stability, financial stability is de facto 
ensured. Consequently, financial instability is taken into account only if and to the extent 
that it affects the inflation objectives.    
b) The emergence of financial conglomerates. This argument has often been 
analysed  during  recent  debates.  During  the  last  years,  the  close  connections  between 
banks, insurances and capital market make hard to distinguish between the individual 
activities of each financial conglomerate. A sectoral control can prove less efficient in 
this situation due to arbitrage problems
4. 
c) The concentration of power within the central bank. The assignment of the 
regulation  and  supervision  tasks  to  an  independent  central  bank  can  be  considered 
                                                 
3 Financial Services Authority – represents the SSA for the United Kingdom.  
4 This refers to the possibility a company has to concentrate its activity in certain branches of the 
conglomerate with the purpose to get in or out of the supervision area of a certain regulation and 
supervision authority. The creation of a SSA would eliminate this possibility. Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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prejudicial  due  to  possible  abuses.  The  central  bank  can  become  an  excessively 
bureaucratic institution.   
Most  of  the  studies  pleading  for  the  set  up  of  a  SSA  are  carried  out  by 
researchers from countries where a SSA already exists. The study performed by HFSA 
(2000: pp.1-17) joins the same direction. The strongest argument for the constitution of 
HFSA in 2000 was the improvement of the efficiency of consolidated supervision, and 
the improved management of the integrated agency was defined as an important task of 
the  reforming  reorganisation  process.  The  management  of  HFSA  contributed  to  the 
increase  of  financial  actors’  reliability  and  the  merger  of  the  regulation  agencies 
highlighted the fact that certain provisions of the legislation specific for each supervised 
institution contradicted one another or they included unjustified discrepancies. The set up 
of a SSA remedied this situation.   
Another  argument  in  favour  of  the  separation  between  the  supervision  and 
monetary function is the passage to universal banks which makes difficult for the central 
bank to separate or to make the distinction between the financial institutions which can or 
cannot benefit from the safety nets offered by the central bank. 
Briault  (2002:  pp.6-7)  advances  a  series  of  elements  in  favour  of  the 
unification: economies of scale, emergency of financial conglomerates, but also: 
- Neutralization of the arbitrage. There are cases in which financial institutions 
supplying  similar  services  or  products  are  supervised  by  different  authorities.  This 
situation can involve the location of a certain financial service or product in that area of 
the financial conglomerate that supposes lower supervision costs or where the supervision 
is less restrictive. 
-  Flexibility  of  regulation.  A  potential advantage  of  the  unified  supervision 
theory resides in a more flexible supervision system. Specialized (sectoral) authorities 
could be hindered from acting effectively in case the judicial status gives rise to doubts or 
they could encounter problems when they have to face particular situations, e.g. when a 
new  type  of  product  or  institution,  which  is  not  covered  by  the  legislation  in  force, 
appears.   
-  Creation  of  a  specialist  team.  An  essential  requirement  for  an  efficient 
regulation  and  supervision  is  that  a  regulation  agency  has  to  be  capable  to  attract, 
maintain  and  develop  a  group  of  qualified  specialists.  The  unification  can  bring  its 
contribution to this process, a unified agency can be better situated within the definition 
of a human resources policy, including carrier planning and staff related strategies. 
-  Improvement  of  accountability.  The  final  argument  in  favour  of  the 
unification is that it improves the supervision related accountability. In a system with 
multiple supervision agencies, it may be more difficult to monitor if the regulation and 
supervision  authorities  are  accountable  for  their  performances,  for  the  costs  they 
determine, etc.  
Mayes (2006: p.61) also puts forward the idea of a SSA, which must take the 
responsibility of conducting the regulation and supervision activity and also make prompt 
decisions regarding the problems related to capital adequacy.  
Another  argument  for  the  constitution  of  a  SSA  and  which  is  not  usually 
described in the economic literature is the creation of the framework required to facilitate 
the  signature  of  the  Memoranda  of  Understanding  (MoU)  between  the  supervision 
authorities.  This  argument  is  mainly  related  to  the  need  of  particular  financial 
conglomerates  supervision.  It  is  often  required  to  involve  institutions  from  different 
countries, and the conclusion of a MoU between two SSA from different countries is 
more practical than the signature of three or more different MoU, between the sectoral 
supervision authorities in the two countries.  Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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A key factor in order for a regulation structure to be efficient is to reflect, up to 
a certain point, the structure of the regulated industry. For example, when the universal 
banks are predominant in the financial system, having significant activities on the capital 
markets, a combined regulation and supervision of banks and securities is preferable. 
Another  reason  for  combining  the  activities  related  to  banking  and  capital  markets 
regulation is the fact that the risk appears in the assets side of the balance sheet. The 
situation is different for the insurance companies because the main risks are related to the 
liabilities side. However, the synergy between the banking activity and the insurance 
activity (“bancassurance” phenomenon) determined the supervision of these two sectors 
by a joint supervision authority in certain countries – France for example.   
The set up of a SSA has to be realized taking into account the characteristics of 
the  financial  system  and  the  international  context.  The  development  of  financial 
conglomerates is in our opinion the main argument that highlights the importance of the 
flexibility of a SSA
5. The increase of the number of conglomerates, in which different 
categories  of  financial  institutions,  both  national  and  international,  are  operating, 
determined the regulation authorities to look for efficient methods to supervise them. 
Fragmented  supervision  can  cause  problems  in  respect  of  risks  assessment  on  a 
consolidated  basis.  The  experience  showed  that  the  effective  supervision  of  various 
financial conglomerates imposes certain requirements related to the supervision bodies, 
which  are  not  usually  presented  in  a  simple  organizational  structure.  As  we will see 
further on, there are solutions both for financial conglomerates supervision at national 
level  by  means  of  setting  up  mixed  supervision  committees,  as  well  as  for  the 
transnational conglomerates supervision through the conclusion of MoU.   
The trade-off between banking supervision and monetary policy objectives and 
the excessive power concentration into central banks do not stand for solid arguments for 
setting  up  a  SSA.  The  importance  of  the  moral  hazard  is  overestimated  because  the 
central banks can always find the way and the instruments to impose penalties upon the 
managers  and  the  shareholders  of  an  insolvent  institution.  The  excessive  power 
concentration can also appear in case of a SSA constitution.    
 
4. The European regulation and supervision framework 
 
There  are  some  issues  related  to  the  European  regulation  and  supervision 
framework  which  must  be  clarified.  The  first  question  that  arises  is  related  to  the 
opportunity  to  have  a  single  regulation  and  supervision  authority  at  European  level. 
Secondly, we have to analyse the possibility for the ECB to play this role. Finally, we 
have to establish what supervision framework we should have in place in order to ensure 
a better coordination between national and European supervision authorities. 
The  economic  literature  provides  arguments  for  and  against  a  centralized 
supervision function. One of the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy is the establishment of 
a common European financial system (Goodhart, 2004: pp.12-13). This author proposes 
the transfer of fiscal competences in the management of bank crisis and the transfer of 
banks’ supervision function at central level. In his opinion, these two functions must not 
be separated. 
At present, at European level, there are different committees monitoring the 
identification  of  systemic risk  in  each financial sector. These  authorities  have  only  a 
                                                 
5  Financial  conglomerates  are  traditionally  defined  as  groups  of  institutions  which  carry  out 
activities  at  least  in  two  out  of  the  following  sectors:  banking,  insurance,  securities.  They 
“combine banking, insurance and investment services in a single corporation” (Morrison, 2002: 
p.11).  Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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coordination role and they do not dispose of adequate intervention instruments. They 
constituted  together a Joint  Forum  for the financial conglomerates supervision  which 
recommended  the  creation  of  a  Mixed  Technical  Group  (MTG),  where  supervised 
financial sectors should be represented. 
The European supervision framework is shortly described by Gulde and Wolf 
(2004: pp.56-57). At European level, the regulation and supervision intervene at three 
levels: at the first level we have the Ecofin Council, at the second level the regulation 
committees  vote  the  European  Commission’s  (EC)  proposals  related  to  the  technical 
measures for implementation and finally, at the third level, the committees advise the EC 
about the measures adopted at the second level and promote the implementation of the 
European  Directives  and  of  the  convergence  in  the  supervision  practices.  While  the 
institutional  structure  includes  a  second  level  concerning  the  financial  conglomerates 
(and, optionally, a third level), the strategy in place focuses on the individual supervision 
of each sector (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The framework for Formalized European Co-operation in Banking and Insurance 
Supervision 







































Source: Gulde and Wolf (2004: p.56) 
 
Another  issue  intensely  discussed  is  the  ECB  role  in  the  financial  system 
regulation and supervision. The ECB does not have a statutory responsibility in this field 
and the supervision institutions act at national level. The ECB’s main objective is the 
implementation of the monetary policy and its involvement in the supervision activity 
could  have  several  implications  regarding  the  independence,  transparency  and 
responsibilities of this institution. The loss of the ECB’s reputation involves more severe 
consequences as compared to the loss of a national central bank’s reputation.   
We  wonder  if  the  ECB  should  not  get  more  involved  in  the  supervision 
activities.  We  consider  that  the  administration  of  the  TARGET  is  not  sufficient  to 
guarantee the stability of the European financial system and we are also aware that the 
ECB can not accomplish a centralized LOLR function. A stronger relation between the 
ECB and the MTG is necessary and, consequently, a much deeper involvement of the 
ECB in the supervision activity. The ECB must represent the link between the MTG and 
the national central banks (NCB) – the only institutions capable to ensure the LOLR 
function.  
A  possible  supervision  framework  at  European  level  which  show  the 
compatibility between the national sectorial supervision framework and the centralised 
supervision structure is presented in Figure 1. The difference between the centralized and 
national  supervision  framework  is  the  location  of  the  Mixed  Supervision  Committee 
inside  the  NCB.  This  is  necessary  because  the  NCB  are  the  only  institutions  which 
dispose  of  the  appropriate  tools  for  preventing  financial  instability.  The  NCB  must 
coordinate the Committee’s actions and must take the appropiate decision as soon as Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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possible. At European (central) level, there is only an informative relation between ECB 
and MTG because the intervention instruments belong to the NCB. 
 




















In our opinion, if, at national level, a SSA replaces the Mixed Supervision 
Committee and operates outside the NCB, the resulting supervision framework will slow 
down the decision making process in case of financial stability. At the same time, the role 
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) will be considerable reduced. In order 
to  have  a  good  coordination  and  cooperation,  the  national  and  central  supervision 
framework must have the same structure. 
Another  debate  in  the  literature  regards  the  implementation  of  a  European 
Financial Service Authority (EFSA), and this subject gained again the attention in the 
context  of  the  recent  financial  crisis.  Eijffinger  (2001:  p.1)  considers  that  this 
preoccupation is based on banking and capital market integration trend, this institution 
being able to increase the overall transparency of the banking supervision, but this will 
also suppose the modification of the Treaty.  
We raise the question if this new supervision framework will be more efficient. 
Without  performing  a  cost-benefit  analysis,  we  can  reach the  conclusion that  a  good 
collaboration between European and national supervision structures can occur when the 
two frameworks are similar. This means that each member state must implement a SSA 
and we showed that this is not always recommended. The Mixed Supervision Committees 






















European Level  National Level 
Banking 
supervision 
Where :           Represents the reports prepared by national supervision agencies for the European 
Committees, which contribute to a better regulation and a detection of each sector’s risks; 
              Represents the information collected by the MSC from each supervision agency and it is 
meant to identify the systemic risks, especially the ones caused by the financial conglomerates; 
             Represents  the  information  exchange  for  the  regulation  harmonization  and  the 
identification of the risks suspected to affect the stability of the European financial system; 
Information  about  systemic  risks  at  national  and  central  level  (double  control);             
Represents  the  ECB  and  NCB  information  by  the  MTG  and  MSC  in  relation  with 
systemic risk and the implementation of the action plans            
Represents  the Eurosystem coordination process Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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can accomplish an important part of the SSA activity, especially in case of consolidated 
supervision. 
Consequently, in countries where the banking sector prevails and where the 
central  banks  have  an  important  supervision  experience,  a  decentralized  supervision 
framework is more appropriate. The NCB must act as an “umbrella” in the supervision 
activity (the Mixed Committees can be a distinct department within the central banks or 
the Financial Stability Department). Removing central banks from the bank supervision 
activity means a rupture between the monetary policy and stability policy at national and 
European level. The relationship between the ECB and NCB is not a formal one, based 
only on an information exchange like the EFSA – SSA relation. The SEBC implication in 
supervision means coordination and actions based on real intervention tools meant to 
ensure  financial  systemic  stability.  Even  the  specialists  which  sustain  the  SSA 
implementation agree that the supervision practices are more important that the change of 
the  institutional  framework  and  propose  a  progressive  approach  in  the  supervision 
framework of financial conglomerates. 
 
5. The supervision’s unification trend in Europe and the Romanian case  
 
We  described  above  the  centralized  supervision  framework  and  a  possible 
cooperation  framework  with  the  national  authorities.  We  will  present  bellow  the 
particular cases of the SSA implementation in different European countries and we will 
demonstrate that, at present, the unified supervision framework is not appropriate for the 
Romanian financial system.  
In respect of the financial supervision of European Union member states, this 
widely differs from one country to another (Annex 1). No less than 10 countries, out of a 
total of 27, have implemented a SSA before 2004. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  Germany,  Latvia,  Malta,  United  Kingdom,  Sweden  and  Hungary. 
Countries such as: Bulgaria
6, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovenia dispose of a specialized supervision for each financial sector. The remaining 
countries have hybrid supervision institutions. 
The first European countries where a SSA was implemented were the Northern 
Countries. The unification of the supervision was necessary after the banking crisis in the 
’80, when central banks failed in applying prudential supervision. Another feature of 
these  countries is the  high  concentration  of  the  financial system  and  the  presence  of 
financial conglomerates. The fact that the financial industry in Baltic Countries imitates 
the pattern of Northern Countries, constituted a sufficient reason for the implementation 
of a SSA in these countries too. Many banking groups from Sweden and Finland activate 
in Estonia and Latvia. However, a reorganization of the supervision activity was not 
needed here because the Baltic Countries were confident from the very beginning in the 
efficiency of unified supervision.  
The situation was different in the United Kingdom. The FSA was created in 
1997  in  particular  due  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  nine  supervision  agencies  which 
performed their activity in this field. By the set up of the FSA, a tripartite cooperation 
agreement was signed between the Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury. The 
model was also adopted by Ireland. Nevertheless, this supervision framework did not 
                                                 
6 Bulgaria  modified the financial supervision  framework  by the unification of the supervision 
agencies  for  capital  market  and  insurance  sector  (Securities  Commission,  State  Insurance 
Supervision Agency and Insurance Supervision Agency). In this way, the Financial Supervision 
Commission was established, having as main purposes to protect the investors’ interests and to 
increase the transparency of financial markets. Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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prove its efficiency in 2007 when, after the subprime crisis in the United States, the 
Northern Rock from England was affected. The FSA failed in prudential supervision and 
the central bank had to intervene in its quality of LOLR (Buiter, 2007: p.11).  
The HFSA from Hungary was set up in 2000. The main reasons put forward for 
the reorganization of the supervision framework were the interconnection of activities in 
the banking sector, insurances and financial investments. At the same time, the idea of a 
better supervision on consolidated basis was sustained. However, another reason was the 
lack in legislation which resulted in supervision arbitrage.  
In 2002, the BaFin was created in Germany as an SSA subordinated to the 
Ministry  of  Finance,  its  activity  being  financed  by  the  supervised  institutions. 
Bundesbank still has a formal involvement in supervision.  
In Malta, a SSA was also set up in 2002 (Malta Financial Services Authority – 
MFSA). In this case the supervision authority is completely autonomous and it reports 
directly to the Parliament. The decision for setting up the MFSA was the result of the 
reform in the financial system legislation, like in Hungary.  
In  Belgium,  the  Banking,  Finance  and  Insurance  Commission  (CBFA)  was 
created in 2004 having as main objective to protect the deponents and the insurants. 
CBFA is also responsible for prudential control. 
The most recent unified supervision framework was established in Poland, on 
the  1
st  of January  2008,  by  the  set  up  of  the  Polish  Financial  Supervision  Authority 
(PFSA). In this case also, the main argument was the presence of financial conglomerates 
and their importance. Until 2008, the banking supervision was performed by the Banking 
Supervision Commission. It was finally proved that the supervision unification was a 
political decision and it does not represent the best option, the central bank remaining de 
facto responsible for the banking sector supervision in Poland.   
We can see that there is a trend related to unified supervision in Europe. But 
not all of these SSA fulfil the independence and credibility criteria, neither do they have 
clearly defined objectives for ensuring financial stability. For example, in Germany, the 
activity  of  BaFin  is  financed  by  the  supervised  entities,  situation  that  may  lead  to 
pressures from these institutions. In Hungary, the legislative framework gave room to 
interpretations and to the arbitrage phenomenon. In Poland, the supervision activity of the 
Banking Commission was insufficient. 
Numerous studies focused on the econometric identification of those elements 
which determined the modification of the regulation and supervision framework. Their 
results show that the set up of a SSA mainly occurred in countries where the capital 
market has an important place, the market capitalization reaches a high level, the presence 
of  conglomerates  is  significant  and  good  governance  policies  are  in  place,  policies 
characterized by high quality services and limited political interference in choosing and 
appointing  the  governors  (Masciandaro,  2004:  pp.21-22;  Feyler,  2008:  pp.13-15).  In 
addition, an important factor influencing the creation of a SSA is the central banks’ poor 
experience and involvement in the supervision activity. The independence, authority and 
credibility of the central bank are also important. If a weak involvement of the Central 
Bank represents a status quo, the authorities do not wish an increased involvement in 
order to avoid moral hazard and bureaucratic effects (Masciandaro, 2007: p.3). This is 
called “central bank fragmentation effect”. 
As Abrams and Taylor (2000: p.29) argued, the supervision unification must 
take into consideration at least the following key elements: prerequisites for effective 
supervision  (independence,  credibility,  accountability,  clear  objectives);  regulatory 
framework  (presence  of  financial  conglomerates,  regulatory  arbitrage  problems, Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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coordination  problems);  structure  of  financial  system  (dominant  banking  system; 
presence of universal banks). 
None of the above mentioned elements indicates the need to implement a SSA 
in Romania. The banking sector is the major component of the financial system and the 
NBR  enjoys  the  independence  and  credibility  necessary  to  enforce  an  efficient 
supervision.  The  supervision  activity  objectives  are  clearly  defined  and  there  are  no 
arbitrage  cases.  The  legislative  framework  does  not  leave  room  for  different 
interpretations
7.  The  problem  related  to  financial  conglomerates  exists,  but  it  can  be 
managed by a mixed supervision committee. The Romanian supervision framework is 
compatible  with  the  centralized  framework  and  it  can  thus  ensure  a  corresponding 
information flow.   
One  of  the  Romanian  financial  system  features  is  a  reduced  intermediation 
degree and the activity of the insurance companies and financial investment companies is 
limited. The banking sector still remains the most important sector within the financial 
system. NBR presents all characteristics necessary for a supervision authority.  
The  financial  conglomerates  in  Romania  act  mainly  in  the  banking  sector: 
Allianz, ING Group, Société Générale, Unicredito, San Paolo, Raiffeisen, National Bank 
of Greece or Alpha Bank. Most of these financial conglomerates are shareholders within 
Romanian  banks  and  insurance  companies.  Their  activity  is  therefore  supervised  by 
Romanian  supervision  authorities,  being  considered  highly  important.  The  national 
legislation  (in  accordance  with  the  2002/87/CE  Directive  related  to  the  additional 
supervision  of  financial  conglomerates),  gives  the  possibility  for  an  additional 
supervision to be made at the level of each group which has the characteristics of a 
financial conglomerate.     
The  NBR  undertook  some  safety  precautions  to  prevent  the  systemic  risk 
caused by the financial conglomerates. By adopting the European legislation, the NBR 
has  the  possibility  to  appeal  to  an  information  exchange  with  the  partner  countries 
supervision authorities. Mutual information refers to foreign subsidiaries. Thereby, the 
NBR has concluded MoU with the regulation and supervision authorities from: Cyprus, 
Greece,  Italy,  Germany,  Netherlands,  France  and  Hungary  (the  origin  countries  of 
financial  conglomerates  active  in  Romania  which  are  considered  partner  countries  in 
prudential supervision). 
The information exchange between national supervision authorities is also very 
important. In our opinion, the cooperation between the NBR and the other supervision 
authorities is not transparent enough, even if a collaboration agreement has been signed. 
This agreement stipulates: a clear tasks delimitation, professionalism and transparency, 
cooperation  in  regulation,  efficiency,  confidentiality  and  an  ongoing  exchange  of 
information.   
This  national  Agreement  (Protocol)  was  signed  on  the  10  of  March  2006 
between  NBR,  NSC  and  ISC.  The  PPSSC  joined  the  agreement  in  2007.  The  MoU 
foresees quarterly Committees meetings between the decision-making bodies of the four 
authorities:  NBR  governor,  the  NSC  president,  the  ISC  president  and  the  PPSSC 
president (or between the members assigned to represent these authorities). Five distinct 
Committees  are  stipulated  in  the  protocol:  the  Financial  Stability  Committee;  the 
Supervision and  Control Committee;  the  Regulation  Committee; the  Payment  System 
                                                 
7 NBR is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the banking sector while the insurance 
and securities regulation and supervision are ensured by the Insurance Supervisory Commission 
(ISC) respectively by the National Securities Commission (NSC). In 2007, the private pension 
funds began their activity in Romania and the Private Pension System Supervisory Commission 
(PPSSC) is in charge with the supervision of their activities. Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
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Committee  and the  Financial  Statistics  Committee. Members  of all the  parties  in  the 
Protocol are included in the structure of these technical committees and the presidency is 
ensured based on a rotation procedure. 
As we can see, the collaboration process has a functional disposal. In the event 
of a financial instability period, the information exchange can be slowed down due to this 
spread over structure. These separate Committees do not perform their activity within the 
NBR and their quarterly meetings are not frequent enough. In this case, the information 
exchange can prove inefficient. There is no stipulation related to the organization of an 
extraordinary meeting or to the conditions which can lead to such a meeting. We sustain 
the idea that NBR must be the leading authority in this Protocol because it is the only 
institution which disposes of the necessary tools to prevent a financial crisis. 
At ECOFIN Council recommendations, an additional agreement was concluded 
in 2007 between the Ministry of Finance, National Bank of Romania, National Securities 
Commission  Insurance  Supervisory  Commission  and  the  Private  Pension  System 
Supervisory  Commission  for  cooperation  in  the  field  of  financial  stability  and  crisis 
management and for facilitating the information exchange. Based on this agreement, the 




The  arguments  for  and  against  the  maintenance  of  the  regulation  and 
supervision function of the banking sector within the central banks mutually equilibrate 
themselves, none of the two thesis eliminates the other. However, in case of an economy 
whose development is ongoing, including the former planned economies experiencing 
transition nowadays, more factors incline the balance in favour of the integration. Many 
central  banks in these  countries  have  been  reformed  and they  enjoy  solid  guarantees 
related to independence (sometimes  guaranteed by the constitution). Their governors’ 
positions are very strong and the central banks have their own financing sources. As 
Schinasi (2003: p.15) noted, “the central banks have a natural role in terms of financial 
stability”. 
We  have  to  mention  that  the  effective  supervision  can  not  be  guaranteed 
through the modification of the regulation structure and the recent trend to set up a SSA 
at European level does not always stand for the best solution. Buiter (2007: pp.13-16) 
considers that after the failure to prevent the financial turbulences at the end of 2007, the 
supervision  structure  in  the  United  Kingdom  proved  its  limitations,  the  FSA  being 
inefficient. It is necessary for the central banks to remain involved in this process as they 
are the bodies which have available the instruments necessary to correct the imbalances. 
Through their participation to the ESCB and due to the information access, the 
NCB can gain an advantage in terms of prudential control and systemic risk management. 
The NCB are both a component of the EU structures and national institutions, fact which 
can represent an advantage in solving international issues or issues related to the efficient 
functioning of the European financial system supervision. Unlike these institutions, the 
national  supervision  authorities  which  are  distinct  from  the  central  banks  have  an 
exclusive national mandate and have only formal or sometimes informal connections with 
the  Ministry  of  Finance  in  the  respective  country.  In  case  a  problem  occurs,  these 
agencies show too little interest in systemic aspects.    
Nevertheless, the choice of a certain supervision regime has an endogenous 
nature depending on the economy and on the institutions’ structure, on the context but 
also on the definition given to the financial stability safety nets. Moreover, it is necessary 
to take into account an average or a longer time horizon. Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
 
  18 
The  regulation  and  supervision  framework  in  Romania is a  sectoral  one.  It 
reflects the structure of a financial system where the banking sector has a significant 
share. By the set up of mixed supervision committees between the national authorities, 
the  compatibility  with  the  supervision  framework,  under  construction  at  EU  level,  is 
ensured and, at the same time, the decision making process gains an increased efficiency. 
However, the functional structure of these mixed committees should be revised to have an 
adequate systemic overview. In addition, taking into consideration the fact that only the 
NBR possesses the instruments required to correct the imbalances, the mixed committee 
should function under the tutelage of this institution. 
We do not exclude the possibility to rethink the Romanian financial supervision 
in the future. One of the most important elements is the remodelling of the European 
supervision framework by the creation of a European Authority of Financial Services (a 
solution strongly rejected by the Romanian authorities at the European summit held in 
October  2008  with  the  purpose  of  improving  the  supervision  activities  in  Europe). 
Another reason is the failure to cooperate in the supervision of financial conglomerates. 
The elimination of the NBR from the banking supervision activity does not represent a 
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Annex 1: Supervision authorities in EU countries 
 
No. crt  Country  Banks  Securities  Insurance 
1  Austria  U, CB  U  U 
2  Belgium  U  U  U 
3  Bulgaria  CB  S  I 
4  Cyprus  CB  S  I 
5  Czech Republic  CB  S  I 
6  Denmark  U  U  U 
7  Estonia  U  U  U 
8  Finland  BS  BS  I 
9  France  BC, B1, B2, B3  CB, S  I 
10  Germany  U, CB  U  U 
11  Greece  CB  S  I 
12  Ireland  CB  CB  CB 
13  Italy  CB, S  CB, S  I 
14  Latvia  U  U  U 
15  Lithuania  CB  S  I 
16  Luxemburg  BS  BS  I 
17  Malta  U  U  U 
18  Netherlands  CB, S  CB, S  I, S 
19  Poland  B  B,S  I1, I2 
20  Portugal  CB  CB, S  I 
21  Romania  CB  S  I 
22  United Kingdom  U  U  U 
23  Slovak Republic  CB  SI  SI 
24  Slovenia  CB  S  I 
25  Spain  CB, Bs(**)  CB, S  I 
26  Sweden  U  U  U 
27  Hungary  U  U  U 
The initials have the following meaning: B = authority specialized in the banking sector; BI = 
authority specialized in the banking sector and insurance sector; CB = central banks; G = 
government; I = authority specialized in the insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the 
securities  market;  U  =  single  authority  for  all  sectors;  BS  =  authority  specialized  in  the 
banking sector and securities market; SI = authority specialized in the insurance sector and 
securities market.  
(*) = state or regional agencies 
Source: Excerpt from Masciandaro (2004:pp.11-13) 
 
 